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CANADA UPDATE: A REVIEW OF
CANADA'S RECENT HOLDING
REGARDING THE PROPOSED SECURITIES
ACT, CANADA's ANTI-SPAM LAW THAT
MAY SOON TAKE EFFECT, AND THE
DISCIPLINARY HEARING OF JOE GROIA
David Paulson*THIS update includes three parts. Part I is a review of a recent
decision by the Supreme Court of Canada that held the proposed
Canadian Securities Act unconstitutional. Part II is a brief sum-
mary of Canada's anti-spam legislation, which is planned to take effect
early next year. Part III is an analysis of a recent decision by the Law
Society of Upper Canada disciplinary board, which found that Mr. Joe
Groia fell below the professional standard of civility.
I. CANADA'S PROPOSED NATIONAL SECURITIES REGIME IS
HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
On December 22, 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada (the Court) held
that the proposed Canadian Securities Act (Securities Act) was unconsti-
tutional.' The Securities Act, if validly adopted, would have created a
single regulatory scheme to govern the trade of securities throughout Ca-
nada.2 A single national regulator has been suggested as the best remedy
to the barriers that an interprovincial system places on market partici-
pants.3 While creating a single national regulator seems like a noble goal,
this is difficult to accomplish without the complete cooperation of each
province; Parliament's general commerce power is limited by "the or-
ganizing principle that the orders of government are coordinate and not
*David Paulson is a third-year law student at SMU Dedman School of Law. He is
currently serving as the student reporter on Canada for the International Law Re-
view Association. He would like to thank Virginia Torrie for her insight on the
Supreme Court of Canada's recent decision regarding the proposed Canadian Se-
curities Act, as well as his family and friends for the support they have given him
during his time in law school.
1. Reference Re Sec. Act, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837 (Can.).
2. Id. at para. 2.
3. See Peer Review of Canada, FIN. SAnul rry BOARD 30 (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.
financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120130.pdf.
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subordinate one to the other."4
The Court analyzed the Securities Act under five factors:
(1) whether the impugned law is part of a general regulatory scheme;
(2) whether the scheme is under the oversight of a regulatory agency;
(3) whether the legislation is concerned with trade as a whole rather
than with a particular industry; (4) whether it is of such a nature that
provinces, acting alone or in concert, would be constitutionally inca-
pable of enacting it; and (5) whether the legislative scheme is such
that the failure to include one or more provinces or localities in the
scheme would jeopardize its successful operation in other parts of
the country.5
Against the backdrop of these factors, the Court found the Securities
Act would have the effect of displacing provincial legislation-after a cer-
tain number of provinces opted in, provinces who chose not to opt-in
would constructively have their provincial legislation displaced. 6 Further,
the Securities Act regulates matters that clearly fall within the provincial
powers-and, if adopted, the effect "would be to duplicate and displace
the existing provincial . . . securities regimes."7
Focusing on the last three factors, the Court found the Securities Act
unconstitutional. 8 The trading of securities relates to a specific industry.9
Under the fourth factor, the Court found the provinces were capable of
passing uniform legislation for most of the matters under the Securities
Act and could delegate responsibility to a single regulator to accomplish
the remaining parts of the Securities Act.' 0 The Court does recognize
certain limitations of the provinces' ability to accomplish this." The fifth
factor appears to be of significance; while the provinces have the choice
of opting in to the Securities Act, the Court notes that the national goals
of the Securities Act would not be met without participation from all of
the provinces.12
While recognizing the importance of a single regulatory scheme, the
Court held the Securities Act as a whole was unconstitutional under Par-
liament's general commerce power.13 But the Court holds open the pos-
sibility that a similar scheme might succeed under Parliament's power to
regulate interprovincial or international trade.14 The Court also suggests
a cooperative approach would be more appropriate.' 5 The Court pointed
4. See Reference Re Sec. Act, 3 S.C.R. 837 at paras. 47, 61-62, 71.
5. Id. at para. 80 (citing General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, 661-662 (Can.)).
6. Id. at para. 99.
7. Id. at paras. 100, 106.
8. Id. at paras. 111, 134.
9. Id. at paras.1 12, 117.
10. Id. at para. 118.
11. See id. at para. 121.
12. Id. at para. 123.
13. See id. at para. 129.
14. Id.
15. See id. at para. 130.
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to the approaches taken by Germany, Australia, and the United States-
a national securities regime similar to these models remains a possibility,
and this decision is likely a step in that direction. 16
II. CANADA'S ANTI-SPAM LAW
On December 15, 2010, Bill C-28 was passed by the Government of
Canada.'7 The purpose of the law is to deter spamming and other decep-
tive and damaging online threats.18 On April 24, 2012, the Ministry of
Industry stated the law is expected to take effect in 2013.19 Part of the
delay may be attributed to the recent ruling that held the Securities Act
unconstitutional and the possibility that Bill C-28 may also raise similar
constitutional concerns.20 The law has been categorized by a number of
articles as the toughest anti-spam law in the world.21 Aside from the rigid
requirements and stiff fines, the private right of action and the damages a
plaintiff may receive are significant. 22
The thrust of the anti-spam provisions centers on an opt-in require-
ment. The law prohibits commercial electronic messages to be sent to a
person, unless that person has previously consented to receiving the mes-
sage.23 There are several exceptions to this general rule, such as product
recall information or information related to confirming a transaction that
was previously entered into-arguably these would be examples of im-
plied consent, which is permitted. 24 There is also a transitional provision,
which appears to provide a small measure of grace for the first three
years after the law takes effect.25
Additionally, the consent requirement is not limited to e-mail; the Bill
defines "electronic message" as "a message sent by any means of tele-
16. Id. at paras. 48-52.
17. Bill C-28: Canada's Anti-Spam Legislation, INous. CANADA, http://www.ic.gc.ca/
eic/site/ecic-ceac.nsf/eng/hgv00567.html (last modified Nov. 11, 2011).
18. Id.
19. Bernice Karn, Canada's Anti-Spam Legislation - Potential Delay?, CASSELS
BROCK LAw. (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.casselsbrock.com/CBNewsletter/The
Cassels_BrockReportApril_2012#art39908.
20. For a comprehensive discussion analyzing Bill C-28 in light of the Court's recent
ruling, see Ravi Shukla, Constitutionality of Anti-Spam Legislation, Lijxoi(.)oY
(July 10, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?ge94047f7-68b8-4e
43-951 b-67139447c01 0.
21. See, e.g., Susanna Sharpe, Implications of Canada's CASL - Toughest Anti-Spam
Law the World Has Ever Seen, CIacLEID (Jan. 18, 2012, 12:17 PM), http://www.
circleid.com/posts/how-canadas-newanti-spam-act-could-affect-your.email
marketing/.
22. An Act to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy by
regulating certain activities that discourage reliance on electronic means of carry-
ing out commercial activities, and to amend the Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission Act, the Competition Act, the Personal Infor-
mation Protection and Electronic Documents Act and the Telecommunications
Act, S.C. 2010, c. 23, § 51 (Can.) [hereinafter Canada's Anti-Spam Legislation].
23. Id. § 6(1).
24. See id. § 6(6)(a)-(g).
25. Id. § 66.
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communication, including a text, sound, voice or image message." 26 A
"commercial electronic message" is an "electronic message" whose pur-
pose is "to encourage participation in a commercial activity. "27
There is also a requirement that even if the "commercial electronic
message" was consented to, it must contain means by which the receiver
can opt-out of future messages. 28 Once a party indicates a preference to
no longer receive any messages from the sender, the sender must give
effect to this preference within ten business days. 29
The law also provides a broad scope of jurisdiction; if the message is
sent or accessed by a computer system in Canada, then the law applies to
the sender.30 The word "accessed" suggests that if the e-mail or other
form of "electronic communication" was routed through some type of
computer system in Canada, then a Canadian court would have jurisdic-
tion.31 There are similar express consent requirements to deter against
spyware, malware, and other online threats. 32
The Bill provides for both administrative monetary penalties and dam-
ages in a private right of action. Only one action may be made, either the
administrative or the private right of action.33 It also appears that who-
ever brings the case first has a right to proceed. 34 In the case of a com-
pany or any person not considered to be an individual, the administrative
monetary penalties are capped at $10,000,000.35 While this is no small
sum, the private right of action may be even more damaging. In addition
to compensatory damages, an individual may also receive a maximum of
$200 for each violation of sending an electronic message without consent,
not to exceed $1,000,000 for each day of occurrence.36 In a case violating
the provisions targeted at spyware and other online threats, the maximum
fine is $1,000,000 for each day the violation occurred.37 In the case of a
single plaintiff this may not seem daunting. But in the context of a class-
action suit, this could easily bankrupt a small business and cause a serious
problem for most mid-size businesses. The impact increases in scope
when considered along with the three-year limitation period.38
26. Id. § 1(1).
27. Id. § 1(2).
28. Id. §§ 6(2)(c), 11(1).
29. Id. § 11(3).
30. John Beardwood & Gabriel M. A. Stern, Complying with Anti-Spam Legislation:





32. See Canada's Anti-Spam Legislation H# 7-8.
33. Id. § 48(1)-(3).
34. See id.
35. Id. § 20(4).
36. Id. § 51(1)(b)(i).
37. See id. § 51(1)(b)(ii).
38. See id. § 47(2).
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If a company sent one e-mail a week to 500 people over the course of
two years, and these e-mails were not consented to in accordance with
this law, the maximum fine would be $10,400,000, and this is a very small
number of recipients. Thankfully, the law provides that a court must con-
sider a number of factors to determine the amount payable under this
law, including the sender's ability to pay.39
While the law appears rather harsh, it contains a number of exceptions
and demands the trial court exercise discretion in determining the fine or
penalty.40 The approach taken by the drafters of the Bill, to make the
law broadly inclusive and then carve out some exclusions, appears to be
an extremely effective way to combat unsolicited messages. In the end,
the law will likely have a strong impact on reducing unwanted e-mails and
phone calls, while at the same time have a limited adverse effect on small
businesses and other individuals whose conduct may not necessarily be
the specific target of this law.
III. THE DISCIPLINARY HEARING OF MR. JOE GROIA AND
THE QUESTIONS THAT REMAIN
The Law Society of Upper Canada (Law Society) is Ontario's self-reg-
ulating body responsible for regulating, licensing, and disciplining law-
yers. 4 1 On June 28, 2012, a Law Society Hearing Panel (Tribunal) found
Mr. Joe Groia guilty of professional misconduct.42 The charge was inci-
vility, or in the words of the Tribunal, "not incivility per se, but rather the
effect of a licensee's alleged uncivil conduct on the administration of jus-
tice." 43 This is a contentious topic and it should be noted that this article
is not proposing that civility is unimportant, but merely suggesting-with
the upmost respect for the Law Society of Upper Canada-that the Tri-
bunal may have, in this case, expanded the definition of civility so dra-
matically as to cause confusion and injury to the public.
A. INTRODUCTION
This article cannot, in this limited space, undertake a detailed examina-
tion of the trial court transcript and evaluate the Law Society's ruling-
nor is this necessary to point out some of the questionable aspects of the
ruling. Rather, this article will focus on three primary aspects of the rul-
ing that are especially troubling. First, the Law Society failed to clearly
define civility; it appears to have held that context has no bearing on
whether one's conduct is civil. Second, there were issues surrounding the
evidence. The Tribunal failed to distinguish between the standard of
39. See id. § 51(3)(a)-(i).
40. See id. § 6(1), 6(6)(a)-(g).
41. About the Law Society, LAw Soc'Y UPPR CANADA, http://www.isuc.on.ca/with.
aspx?id=905 (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
42. Law Soc'y of Upper Can. v. Joseph Peter Paul Groia, [2012] ONLSHP 0094
(Can.).
43. Id. at para. 21.
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proof and the evidentiary burden; but more importantly, a conflict of in-
terest was created when it chose to consider the appellate court tran-
scripts. Third, no one recommended the Law Society look into this
matter-this was a unilateral action by the Law Society that appears to
have been spurred on by the news media.
B. BACKGROUND
A brief background of the events leading up to this ruling is necessary
to understand the impact and the unanswered questions left in its wake.
In 1997, Mr. Groia was retained as counsel by Mr. John Felderhof who
was charged with eight securities violations by the Ontario Securities
Commission (the Commission or OSC).44 During the first seventy days
of the trial there was evidence of several disputes between the prosecu-
tion and defense involving "the admissibility of evidence and by countless
accusations of prosecutorial misconduct made by Mr. Groia." 45 This con-
stant back and forth between the prosecution and defense culminated in
an application by the prosecution, made on April 17, 2001, to have the
judge presiding over the trial removed. 46 Both the Superior Court of On-
tario and the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the application, find-
ing that Justice Peter Hryn did not lose jurisdiction and should continue
to hear the case. 47 But in making this determination, both courts made
extensive comments on Mr. Groia's inappropriate conduct. 48 These com-
ments were admitted into evidence and served as a basis for the Law
Society's finding that Mr. Groia was guilty of professional misconduct.49
The Tribunal held that to permit Mr. Groia to re-litigate these comments
would amount to "an abuse of process."50 After the application for Jus-
tice Hryn's removal was denied and the case was remanded, the Commis-
sion retained new counsel, and the case proceeded without any further
incident.51 Mr. Groia's client was acquitted of all charges in 2007.52 And
in 2009, the Law Society issued Mr. Groia notice of this disciplinary pro-
ceeding. 53 The disciplinary hearing of Mr. Groia appears to be entirely
based on the conduct occurring during the first seventy days of the trial,
just prior to the application from the prosecution to have the trial judge
removed. 54
C. CIVILITY
The Tribunal openly acknowledges there is no single definition of civil-
44. Id. at paras. 4, 7.
45. Id. at para. 9.
46. Id. at para. 10.
47. Id. at paras. 12-13.
48. Id.
49. Id. at paras. 110-11, 156, 178-80, 184-87, 189.
50. Id. at para. 96.
51. Id. at para. 14.
52. Id.
53. Id. at para. 16.
54. See id. at paras. 14, 97.
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ity.5 5 Several sources are listed, and perhaps by cobbling together the
various excerpts one could come up with some basis against which the
Tribunal is measuring Mr. Groia's conduct. The Tribunal quotes the Su-
preme Court of Canada (the Court) in the context of a lawyer who has
written a private letter to a judge criticizing his ruling; the pertinent part
defines incivility as "potent displays of disrespect for the participants in
the justice system, beyond mere rudeness or discourtesy." 56 In the same
decision the Court stated, "[o]n the other hand, lawyers should not be
expected to behave like verbal eunuchs. They not only have a right to
speak their minds freely, they arguably have a duty to do so. But they are
constrained by their profession to do so with dignified restraint."57 The
Court of Appeal for Ontario described incivility as "[u]nfair and demean-
ing comments."58
The Tribunal made several other references to what civility may or may
not look like, but settled on a rather vague definition, stating that incivil-
ity does not necessarily require "the use of a profane language, extreme
rudeness, violence, harassment or racial epithets[;]" rather, "[a] pattern of
conduct that includes persistent attacks and sarcasm directed at opposing
counsel can form the basis of incivility."59
As noted by the Tribunal, Mr. Groia's controversial comments were
made in the first phase of the trial and centered primarily on the prosecu-
tor's failure to comply with the court's rulings regarding document pro-
duction, and the position taken by the Commission that arguably
continued throughout the first phase of this trial-specifically, that the
Commission's "goal [was] simply to seek a conviction." 60
There is ample evidence the Commission had serious shortcomings in
their disclosures. The lead investigator stated these shortcomings were
due to "budgetary considerations." 61 There was evidence to suggest the
prosecutor agreed that a number of documents were authentic and rele-
vant and then subsequently took the contrary position. 62 There was evi-
dence that after failing to disclose all documents, the prosecution's
solution was to produce 197 more boxes, which they alleged would, fi-
nally, comply with the judge's order.63
Indeed, it was not Mr. Groia, but rather the prosecutor, who was cen-
sured for challenging the court's rulings "in a context strongly suggesting
that they were presumptively wrong and unfair."64 Yet, the Tribunal
found there was no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct because Mr.
Groia's client was not acquitted on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct
55. Id. at para. 56.
56. Id. at para. 59.
57. Id.
58. Id. at para. 66.
59. Id. at para. 62.
60. Id. at para. 116.
61. Id. at para. 115.
62. See, e.g., id. at para. 142.
63. Id. at para. 118.
64. Id at para. 173.
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and "[i]ncidents such as the OSC's refusal to produce the relevant docu-
ments and the manner in which the prosecution tendered them did not
amount to prosecutorial misconduct." 65
This is slightly concerning, but what is more concerning is the Tribu-
nal's finding that because Mr. Groia did not seek a stay and pursue a
motion based on prosecutorial misconduct, his only motivation must have
been to disrupt the proceedings by provoking the prosecution.66 And
perhaps most concerning of all, the Tribunal found Mr. Groia fell short of
his "overriding duty to ensure that the trial was conducted fairly and effi-
ciently, and in an atmosphere of calm." 67 The Tribunal found that the
duties Mr. Groia owed to his client were second to ensuring an efficient
trial and an "atmosphere of calm." 68 So, where is this coming from? The
Tribunal quotes the Court:
But, as an officer of the court concerned in the administration of
justice, he has an overriding duty to the court, to the standards of his
profession, and to the public, which may and often does lead to a
conflict with his client's wishes or with what the client thinks are his
personal interests. Counsel must not mislead the court, he must not
lend himself to casting aspersions on the other party or witnesses for
which there is no sufficient basis in the information in his possession,
he must not withhold authorities or documents which may tell
against his clients but which the law or the standards of his profes-
sion require him to produce.69
The Court is stating that counsel should not mislead the court, make
baseless accusations, or withhold documents. This is commonly under-
stood and accepted, but it lends nothing to the Tribunal's statement that
Mr. Groia should have been more concerned with the trial being con-
ducted efficiently and in an "atmosphere of calm" than he should have
been with defending his client. Ironically, the last portion of this quote
explicitly states that one must not withhold documents they are required
to produce, yet according to the Tribunal, "the OSC's refusal to produce
the relevant documents . . . did not amount to prosecutorial
misconduct. "7o
Additionally, the Tribunal states that the conduct of the opposing coun-
sel cannot serve as justification for one's own conduct.7' Perhaps this is
true in some instances, but where the basis of the charge is incivility
rooted in false accusations that were allegedly unjustified, common sense
would dictate that if the accusations had some basis-and were grounded
in the misconduct of opposing counsel-then the Tribunal must address
65. Id. at para. 177.
66. Id. at para. 135.
67. Id. at para. 137.
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting R. v. Lyttle, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193, para. 66 (Can.)).
70. Id. at para. 177.
71. Id. at para. 182.
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this fact.72 There was clearly some basis for all of the accusations Mr.
Groia laid against the prosecution.
While finding that Mr. Groia failed to conduct the trial in an efficient
and calm manner, the Tribunal concluded Mr. Groia did not have a basis
to make these allegations, and because they were unjustified, they consti-
tuted conduct that fell below the standards of professional conduct.73 But
this, the heart of the ruling by the Tribunal, highlights the confusion and
the lack of clarity caused by this decision.
The Tribunal would not recognize any evidence Mr. Groia put on re-
garding the conduct of the prosecution because it claimed this evidence
had no bearing on Mr. Groia's conduct and was not a valid defense, nor
did the Tribunal even call any members of the prosecution as witnesses.7 4
The Tribunal would not let Mr. Groia relitigate the issues raised by the
Superior Court of Ontario and the Court of Appeal for Ontario, despite
the fact that these statements were made in the context of the prosecu-
tion's application to have the trial judge removed.75 The Tribunal fo-
cused the discussion on Mr. Groia's failure of his overriding duty to
ensure the trial was conducted efficiently and in an "atmosphere of
calm," 76 and then found that the "attacks on the prosecution were unjus-
tified and therefore constituted conduct that fell below the standards of
principles of civility, courtesy and good faith required by the Rules of
Professional Conduct."77 The end of the Tribunal's reasoning appears to
rest solidly on the grounds that Mr. Groia was intentionally misleading
the court.78 This appears to be illogical. If the misconduct was based on
unjustified attacks and misleading the court, then why was the conduct of
the opposing counsel irrelevant? Why would the Tribunal not allow Mr.
Groia to defend against the statements found in the rulings by the Supe-
rior Court of Ontario and the Court of Appeal for Ontario?
D. THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND THE CREATION OF A CONFLICT
OF INTEREST
The burden of proof in a disciplinary hearing before the Law Society is
the civil standard, which is proof on a balance of probabilities; otherwise
put-more likely than not.7 While the Tribunal appears to have grasped
this point well, it appears to have failed to understand that regardless of
the standard of proof, the evidence must always be "clear, convincing and
72. Id. at para. 190.
73. Id.
74. Id. at paras. 26, 182.
75. Id. at para. 96.
76. Id. at para. 137.
77. Id. at para. 190.
78. Id. at para. 189.
79. How to Prepare for an Ontario Tribunal Hearing, LAw Soc'y UPPER CANADA,
http://rc.Isuc.on.ca/jsp/ht/prepareForTribunalHearing.jsp (last updated June 2012);
see also F.H. v. McDougall, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 41, paras. 40-44 (Can.).
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cogent."80 The Law Society mistakes the burden of proof for the eviden-
tiary burden when it rejects a high evidentiary standard.81
While the standard of proof states that the evidence must establish that
Mr. Groia is more likely than not guilty of misconduct - the evidence to
support this conclusion must still be "clear, convincing and cogent." 82
The Court explicitly stated this when the Court held, "evidence must al-
ways be sufficiently clear, convincing and cogent to satisfy the balance of
probabilities test." 83 The effect of neglecting this distinction can lead to a
critical error, specifically in this case where the Law Society relied heavily
on the admonishments of the Superior Court of Ontario and the Court of
Appeal for Ontario to support a finding that Mr. Groia was guilty of
incivility.84
The purpose of these hearings before the Superior Court of Ontario
and the Court of Appeal for Ontario was not to determine whether or not
Mr. Groia's conduct was acceptable; the purpose was to determine
whether the trial judge should be removed.85 Mr. Groia was not a party
to these proceedings; he was not even the lawyer who represented the
defense in these proceedings.86
The Tribunal openly acknowledges this and proceeds to suggest, "as a
matter of substance," that he was a party to these proceedings.87 The
Tribunal's ruling does not address the fact that the defense was concerned
with the case against its client, not the critiques of Mr. Groia's conduct.
By holding that the statements made by the Superior Court of Ontario
and the Court of Appeal for Ontario constituted evidence, the Tribunal
appears to suggest that the defense should have focused their appeal on
Mr. Groia's comments.
The appellate transcripts do not have any inherent probative value nor
are they relevant. Unless the Tribunal cannot independently define civil-
ity and must rely on the appellate courts to tell them what it is, there is no
reason why Mr. Groia's conduct should be analyzed in any other context
than that of a complete trial transcript. This would not be such an issue
except for the fact that by considering the transcripts of these appellate
courts the Tribunal is creating a conflict of interest. Instead of advocating
for his client, the lawyer must now advocate for himself or suffer the con-
sequences of having this admitted in a disciplinary hearing. This is fur-
80. Compare Law Soc'y of Upper Can., [2012] ONLSHP 0094, para. 25 (erroneously
conflating the evidentiary burden and the civil standard of proof), with McDougall,
3 S.C.R. 41, paras. 45-46 ("[t]here is only one legal rule and that is that in all cases,
evidence must be scrutinized with care by the trial judge . . . [s]imilarly, evidence
must always be sufficiently clear, convincing and cogent to satisfy the balance of
probabilities test").
81. Law Soc'y of Upper Can., [2012] ONLSHP 0094, para. 25.
82. McDougall, 3 S.C.R. 41, para. 46.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., id. at para. 97.
85. See id. at paras. 10-13.
86. Id. at paras. 39, 91.
87. Id. at para. 92.
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ther highlighted by the fact that the Tribunal would not permit Mr. Groia
to relitigate these issues during the disciplinary hearing.88
E. THE "INVESTIGATION"
The Tribunal goes to great lengths to express the importance of self-
regulation.89 This slowly evolves into the statement that, "[t]he self-gov-
erning aspect of law societies in the public interest, as well as the unique
position of their disciplinary panels to determine when incivility crosses
the line, is well-recognized."90 But the Law Society should be a self-regu-
lating body, not an organization prone to be swayed by the latest head-
lines. Not a single individual appears to have lodged any complaint
against Mr. Groia. The Law Society appears to have first learned about
Mr. Groia's conduct from a news report, and it remains unclear whether
the Law Society even read the transcript of the trial court prior to filing a
notice of the hearing against Mr. Groia. 91
These facts suggest the possibility that the Law Society had an agenda
prior to bringing trial against Mr. Groia; this is further supported by the
Tribunal's statements regarding a recent decline in civility that raises
some concerns. 92
F. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that during a trial a lawyer can cross the line and say
something that is quite uncalled for, but this recent finding of misconduct
does little to suggest where the line is actually crossed, or to what extent a
lawyer's inappropriate response may be tempered by the circumstances.
Additionally, this ruling creates a conflict of interest by finding Mr. Groia
should have refuted or appealed the comments made by the Superior
Court of Ontario and the Court of Appeal for Ontario. This conflict is
further amplified by the Tribunal's holding that the comments are irrefu-
table persuasive evidence of Mr. Groia's misconduct. Most significantly,
the Tribunal suggests that a lawyer's duties to his client are second to the
duties of ensuring the trial is conducted in an efficient and calm manner.
Civility is important, an interest that has long been recognized, but the
Tribunal's concept of civility is over-aggressive. Civility in the context of
refraining from misleading the court, refraining from making racial epi-
thets, or cursing, is one thing-these likely take precedence over a law-
yer's duty to fiercely advocate for his client. But efficiency and calm
should not be wrapped into the same category as misleading a tribunal,
nor should efficiency and calm take precedence over the duty to zealously
advocate.
88. Id. at para. 96.
89. Id. at paras. 74-80.
90. Id. at para. 79.
91. Id. at paras. 18, 20.
92. Id. at para. 72.
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